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C.: Banks and Banking--Duties and Liabilities of a Director
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
BANKs AND BANKING -

DUTMS AND LLBILITIES OF A DIRECTOR.

The receiver of a national bank sued a director on a note given
for eighty shares of stock in the bank, which the director had been
induced to purchase by the false representations of the bank's
president. These false representations of the president would have
been discovered by the director if he had examined certain reports
which were submitted to the board of directors, and the director
actually knew of the falseness of the representations before the bank
closed, but he made no attempt to rescind the purchase until some
time after the bank closed. He now sets up a counter-claim based
on a rescission of the purchase because of the false representations.
Held, that assuming everything else in the director's favor, the fact
that he was a director prevented his recovery on this counter-claim.
It was his duty as a director to examine the books of the bank, and
had he done so he would have learned of the falseness of the representations. Judgment for the receiver. Goess v. Eltret.1
The director was under a duty imposed both by statute" and by
common law3 to participate in the management of the bank, and he
could not properly leave the affairs in the hands of its president.
However, this director is not attempting to escape liability for a
neglect of his duty, but is attempting to recover for a fraud perp.etrated on him because of his failure to perform his duty. This
feature makes the case unique, and probably without precedent.
The determination of the case seems to depend on the view that
is taken as to the director's negligence preventing his having any
relief as against an intentional tort, i. e., fraud. *Whi]e there is
authority to the effect that one having access to the facts should
avail himself of the opportunity to investigate, 4 the better view
would seem to be that his failure to investigate should not bar his
right to recover for an intentional wrong.' Granted that directors
'85 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
2 43 STAT. 955 (1925), 12 U. S. C. A. § 73 (1936).
3 Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U. S. 504, 39 S. Ct. 549 (1919); Gamble v.
Brown, 29 F. (2d) 366 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928); cert. denied, 279 U. S. 839, 49 S.
Ct. 253 (1929); Hughes v. Reed, 46 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
4Slaughter's Adm'r v. Gerson, 13 Wall. 379, 20 L. Ed. 627 (U. S. 1872);
Farnsworth v. Duffner, 142 U. S. 43, 47, 12 S. Ct. 161 (1891); Crislip v. Cain,
19 W. Va. 438, 464 (1882); Hallidie v. First Federal Trust Co., 177 Cal. 600,
604, 171 Pac. 431, 432 (1918); Roosevelt v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78
F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
5 Wilson v. Higbee, 62 Fed. 723 (C. C. Nev. 1894) ; Cottrill v. Crum, 100 Mo.
397, 13 S. W. 753 (1890); Wilson v. Carpenter, 91 Va. 183, 21 S. E. 243
(1895); Bowe v. Gage, 127 Wis. 245, 106 N. IV. 1074 (1906); Western Mfg.
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owe a duty to investigate corporate affairs, does this duty run to
the whole world, or merely to the corporation, its stockholders and
creditors? The general view seems to be that the duty runs only
to the corporate creditors and to the corporation and its stockholders.7 If the duty runs to the whole world, then indeed may you
have "negligence in the air' ".8 This is the first case which holds
the director's duty an all inclusive one, and which has the effect
of making the director act at his peril. While the case says that it
does not charge the director with notice of all the corporate books
contain, as does the case of Briggs v. SpauldingO yet it does charge
him with knowledge of the contents of the reports which show the
financial condition of the bank.
There are at least two other grounds on which the case might
possibly have been decided. The district court based its decision
on the fact that a national bank is not permitted to deal with its own
stock, and that a person dealing with it has no recourse for any
loss suffered. 10 It is also conceivable that ]aches might have barred
the director from setting up his counter-claine. He had actual
notice of the fraud six months before the bank closed, and some
time passed after the bank closed before he made any attempt to
rescind the purchase; therefore, under the circumstances of the
case, laches might easily have been the basis for the decision. The
fact that fraud was originally the basis for equitable relief, and the
fact that the court might consider this director as not having "clean
hands", probably had some influence with the court in making their
decision." However, the result of the case seems to be correct,
Co. v. Cotton & Long, 126 Ky. 749, 104 S. W. 758 (1907), 12 L. R. A. (N. S.)
427 (1908). See XARPER, LAw OF TORTs (1933) §§ 150, 224. Staker v. Reese,
82 W. Va. 764, 97 S. E. 641 (1918) and Stout v. Martin and Edgell, 87 NV. Va.
1, 104 S. E. 157 (1920) semble are contra to Crislip v. Cain, 19 W. Va. 438,
supram. 4, inasmuch as they hold that a person has a right to rely on ropresentation without making inquiry to determine its truth.
6 McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); Elliott v.
Farmers' Bank, 61 W. Va. 641, 57 S. E. 242 (1907); Hibernia Bank v. Cincienne, 140 La. 969, 74 So. 267, L. R. A. 1917D 402 (1917).
7-Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616, 22 L. Ed. 492 (U. S. 1874); Buchlor
v. Black, 226 Fed. 703 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915); Hoyle v. Plattsburgh R. Co., 54
N. Y. 315, 328 (71873); Hope v. Valley City Salt Co., 25 NV. Va. 789 (1884).
8 Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 341, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
In this case Justice Cardozo says, "Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak,
will not do."
9 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 162, 163, 11 S. Ct. 924 (1890).
10 Goess v. Ehret, 13 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. N. Y. 1936).
"1Strictly speaking, the "clean hands" doctrine probably would not apply,
since the fraud and the director ' "unclean hands" are not involved in the
same transaction.
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since it tends to discourage dummy directors or directors who are
lax in attending to corporate affairs.
J. E. C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STITUTIONALITY

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - CONOF ACT EXTENDING BANKRUPTCY ACT TO COVER

POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF STATES. - Petitioner, an irrigation district organized under the laws of Texas,' presented a petition to
the District Court in accordance with the Sumners Act,2 amending the Bankruptcy Act 3 to provide for the relief of insolvent
political subdivisions of states by a readjustment of their obligations. The Act provided that a plan of readjustment should be
put in force if (1) the state consented, (2) two-thirds of the creditors should agree to the plan, and (3) the district judge should consider the plan to be a fair one. The state had consented ;4 thirty
per cent of the creditors had consented, and it was believed that
the requisite two-thirds would consent; but the district court dismissed the petition on the ground inter alia, that the Sumners Act
was unconstitutional.5 This decree was reversed in the circuit
court of appeals,0 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, that the Act was unconstitutional in that it impaired state
sovereignty. Four justices dissented. Petition for a rehearing
denied.7 Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District
No. 1.8

The theory of the majority of the Court was that since it was
well established that the federal government and the governments
of the several states were each immune from taxation by the other,9
. Tzx. Cosxr. STAT. (Vernon, 1928) §§ 7622-7807.
2 48 STAT. 798 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-303 (Supp. 1934).
3 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq. (1927).
4 Tex. Laws 1935, c. 107.
GIn re Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103
(1934).
OCameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Ashton, S1 F. (2d)
905 (1936).
7 (1936) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 146.
8 56 S. Ct. 892, 80 L. Ed. 910 (1936).
9 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1819) ; Weston
v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. Ed. 481 (U. S. 1829); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall.
113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (U. S. 1870) ; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322,
21 L. Ed. 597 (U. S. 1873); Mercantile National Bank v. New York, 121 U.
S. 138, 7 S. Ct. 826 (1887); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.. 157 U. S.
429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 158 U. S. 601, 15 S. Ct. 912 (1895); Ambrosini v. United
States, 187 U. S. 1, 23 S. Ct. 1 (1902); Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 570, 51 S. Ct. 601 (1931); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 2S5
U. S. 393, 52 S. Ct. 443 (1932).
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